Security ·
NGINX2Root: a 2015 bug in nginx's HTTP/2 code lets strangers run code, and exploits are public
Este artículo está en inglés.
Updated 19 November, 13:30 UTC
- First version.
nginx runs a large part of the web, and on 18 November it got its biggest security fix in years. The worst of five bugs sits in the code that speaks HTTP/2, has been there since 2015, and can let a stranger run their own code on the server without logging in. Code to attack it is already public.
Status on 19 November 2026, 13:30 UTC
The fix is out: nginx 1.30.7 (stable) and 1.31.9 (mainline), NGINX Plus 37.0.8.1 and 37.3.0.1. Affected: 1.9.5 to 1.31.8 with HTTP/2 switched on. After updating, restart nginx: a reload keeps the old program running.
Debian and Ubuntu: no fixed package yet for their stable releases. Until then, switch HTTP/2 off.
Attacks: none reported, and none of the five is on CISA's list of exploited flaws. Exploit code is public.
The bug in one minute
HTTP/2 lets a browser send many requests over one connection at once. To stop either side from being flooded, both keep a counter of how much data the other may still send, called the flow-control window. Small control messages raise or reset that counter.
In nginx, carefully chosen messages can push the counter past the limit it is supposed to stay under. Xint, who found the bug, describes it as an integer overflow: the number wraps around, and nginx then reads and writes memory outside the buffer it meant to use. Most of the time the worker process simply crashes. With more work, an attacker can turn it into running their own commands, with the rights of that nginx worker.
Two details make it nasty. It needs nothing special on the server: Wiz says it got code running on an nginx that only served ordinary static files. And
the attack is made of control messages (WINDOW_UPDATE and RST_STREAM), not requests, so it doesn't show up in the normal
access log.
Five bugs, one name
"NGINX2Root" is the name Xint gave the set. F5, the company behind nginx, rates all five 9.2 out of 10 (CVSS 4.0). Whether one matters to you depends entirely on your configuration:
Need HTTP/2
- CVE-2026-123007: the flow-control bug above. Any server with HTTP/2 on, 1.9.5 to 1.31.8.
- CVE-2026-123633: memory used after it was freed, when nginx passes HTTP/2 requests on to a backend and runs short of connections. 1.19.7 and up.
Need something rarer
- CVE-2026-121810: HTTP/3 (QUIC) with a backend. 1.25.0 and up.
- CVE-2026-123634: the DNS
resolver, with a backend name built from variables plus amirroror SSI subrequest. - CVE-2026-113425: nginx as a mail proxy with
auth_http. No valid login needed.
Turning HTTP/2 off blocks the first two only. If you use HTTP/3, the resolver or the mail proxy, only the update helps.
Found by five teams
F5 credits Ikotas Labs, Metnir, Rapid7, Wiz and Xint, who reported the bugs separately. Xint published its timeline:
- 11 October An Xint researcher finds the HTTP/2 bug while preparing for the ZeroDay Cloud contest. A few days later an automated Xint scan finds the other four.
- 16 October Reported to F5 through HackerOne.
- 27 October The reports reach the nginx developers.
- 10 November Xint confirms the fixes work.
- 18 November nginx 1.30.7 and 1.31.9 are released, with fixes for ten flaws in total.
The bug itself is older than most of today's web: it came with nginx's very first HTTP/2 release, 1.9.5, in 2015.
How many servers?
Censys counted about 9 million nginx services that show an affected version and have HTTP/2 on, and another 103 million that don't show their version at all. Xint's own search found 56.7 million nginx hosts, of which 11.94 million showed a version, and 98.9% of those were in the affected range.
Both counts overstate it in one way: Linux distributions fix bugs without changing the version number, so an "old" version can be a patched one. And understate it in another: most servers hide their version.
Is there an exploit?
Yes, more than one, with very different claims:
- Rapid7 published working code that leaks memory addresses to get around ASLR (the protection that hides where things are in memory). It says it needs about 128 GB of HTTP/2 traffic and two minutes to an hour, and that on a slow line nginx's own one-hour connection limit stops it.
- Censys says it reproduced the bug in its lab without that much traffic, and published its own code.
- Xint and Wiz say their exploits work reliably, including over the internet on AWS, Google Cloud and Azure. They are keeping the final steps private.
- F5 says code execution is only possible when ASLR is off or bypassed. Wiz and Rapid7 both say they bypassed it.
So the public code is slow and noisy, but the people who know the bug best say it can be done properly. Expect the gap to close.
From nginx to root
An attacker who gets in through nginx runs as the nginx worker, usually a user with few rights. Xint went one step further: it chained the bug with a
separate flaw in the Linux kernel's SCTP code (present since Linux 4.15 in 2018) to become root, even escaping from a Docker container to the host.
That kernel flaw had no CVE and no fix yet when this was written. Servers that don't use SCTP can stop the module from loading with a line
install sctp /bin/false in a file under /etc/modprobe.d/ (this doesn't help if it is already loaded or built in).
Are you affected?
You need both
- nginx 1.9.5 to 1.31.8 without your distribution's fix, NGINX Plus before 37.0.8.1 / 37.3.0.1, or an older R-series release.
- HTTP/2 on:
http2 on;in aserverblock, orhttp2in alistenline.
You're safe from the worst one with
- nginx 1.30.7 or 1.31.9, or a package with the fix.
- HTTP/1.1 only.
- Apache, Caddy, LiteSpeed, IIS: different software (Apache had its own HTTP/2 bug last week).
Look out for nginx you didn't install yourself: Kubernetes ingress controllers, Docker images, control panels and appliances often bundle it. F5's own
ingress controller (5.8.0) and Gateway Fabric (2.9.0) are fixed. The community ingress-nginx project was archived in March and gets no fixes.
What to do
- Find out if you run it.
nginx -vshows the version, but on Debian or Ubuntu check the full package version withdpkg -l nginxand compare it with your distribution's page for CVE-2026-123007.nginx -T 2>/dev/null | grep -n http2shows where HTTP/2 is on. - Update and restart. Take 1.30.7 / 1.31.9 or your distribution's fixed package, then
systemctl restart nginx. Not reload: a reload keeps the old program in memory. - No fixed package yet? On 19 November Debian 12 and 13 were still listed as vulnerable (only Debian's development branch had the fix), and Ubuntu had no fix either. Then switch HTTP/2
off: change
http2 on;tohttp2 off;in everyserverblock (or removehttp2fromlistenlines on nginx before 1.25.1), runnginx -t, and restart. Sites keep working over HTTP/1.1. gRPC needs HTTP/2, so test that first. - Don't count on a CDN. Cloudflare and similar services keep talking HTTP/2 to your visitors even after you switch it off, so nobody notices. But they only protect you
if your server can't be reached directly. Test from outside with
openssl s_client -connect YOUR-IP:443 -servername YOUR-SITE -alpn h2: if it answersALPN protocol: h2, HTTP/2 is still reachable. - Look for signs. Xint suggests watching for one long connection from a single address that keeps receiving data while sending little, workers
crashing in
error.log, and any program started by an nginx worker. That last one is the clearest sign of a break-in.
We did the same on our own servers: HTTP/2 is off until our distribution ships the fix. Visitors still get HTTP/2 from Cloudflare in front of us.
The other five fixes
The same releases fix five more flaws. One deserves attention: CVE-2026-118899, rated major by nginx, lets a client send nginx into an endless loop
while it reads a request body over TLS 1.3, in 1.13.0 to 1.31.8. It doesn't need HTTP/2, so switching HTTP/2 off doesn't help against it. The others are rated
minor or medium: a crash with PROXY protocol v2 (1.31.4 to 1.31.8 only), an overflow with alias and try_files, a client
certificate check that can be skipped through SNI in the stream module, and weak checks in ssl_preread.
Why this is on Blackout Map
This is a software flaw, not an outage, and it won't show on our map. But its most common ending is a crash, and nginx serves so much of the web that crashing it at scale would be an outage for millions of sites. Our Security watch tracks the flaws that are really being used. Read also Can a software flaw take the internet down?
Sources
- nginx security advisories (all ten flaws, severities, affected and fixed versions)
- Xint: NGINX2Root (how the bug works, timeline, kernel chain, Shodan count, detection, mitigations)
- Qualys: NGINX2Root, how to find, mitigate and patch (CVSS, F5 advisories, NGINX Plus builds, ingress controllers)
- SecurityWeek: F5 patches critical NGINX2Root flaws as PoC exploits go public (finders, Rapid7, Censys and Wiz findings)
- F5 security notification K000164058 and K000163926 (CVE-2026-123007)
- Debian security tracker: CVE-2026-123007
- Ubuntu: CVE-2026-123007
- CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (none of the five listed on 19 November)
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